A driver in the war-torn region of Eastern Ukraine escaped injury or death this week after an errant missile struck a road a few feet in front of his car, reports Russian news agency RIA Novosti. 

Dash cam footage of the incident show the driver's blue Lada sedan proceeding down Petrovsky Street in the city of Donestk when a missile suddenly craters the pavement in front of him.

The driver, whose identity is unknown, wasn't injured, but he was knocked unconscious by the force of the blast. 

The driver credited his Russian-built Lada's stout steel construction for his survival.

The source of the missile is a mystery. While Russian news organizations claim the missile strike is the latest in series of attacks by Ukraine, the truth of those claims remain unconfirmed.

Here's video of the aftermath:

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While helping Iraqi forces to break the Islamic State's siege of Amerli, the US Air Force supported a deadly Shia militia that is responsible for killing hundreds of US soldiers. The Shia militia, known as Asaib al Haq, or the League of the Righteous, has also captured and executed US soldiers and British citizens in the past.

Iraqi forces, supported by "paramilitary forces" such as the League of the Righteous, advanced on Amerli late last week and reached the town by Aug. 31, The Washington Post reported. By Sept. 1, the siege, which lasted for more than two months, was lifted.

Na'im al Aboudi, the spokesman for the League of the Righteous, confirmed that his group is operating in Amerli and in surrounding villages.

As of Aug. 31, the US military launched four airstrikes against Islamic State forces in Amerli, according to US Central Command, or CENTCOM.

"At the request of the Government of Iraq, the US military conducted airstrikes in support of an operation to deliver humanitarian assistance to address the humanitarian crisis and protect the civilians trapped in Amerli, Iraq at approximately 8:30 p.m. EDT today [Aug. 30],"CENTCOM reported. Three airstrikes and a humanitarian aid drop were conducted on Aug. 30, and another on Aug. 31.

A seasoned Shia terror group

The League of the Righteous is not a newly-formed Shia militia that rose up in the wake of the Islamic State's takeover of much of Western, central, and northern Iraq this year. The League of the Righteous was formed in 2006 as an offshoot of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. The militia was the largest and most powerful of what the US military called the Special Groups, or Shia militias backed by Iran. The group was at the forefront in using EFPs, or explosively formed penetrators, the deadly landmines that can penetrate US armored vehicles. Hundreds of US soldiers were killed in EFP attacks.

Asaib al Haq was directly implicated by General David Petraeus in the January 2007 attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala. Five US soldiers were killed during the Karbala attack and subsequent kidnapping attempt. The US soldiers were executed by League of the Righteous fighters after US and Iraqi security forces closed in on the assault team.

The attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center was a complex, sophisticated operation. The assault team, led by tactical commander Azhar al Dulaimi, was trained in a mock-up of the center that was built in Iran. The unit had excellent intelligence and received equipment that made them appear to be US soldiers. Some of the members of the assault team are said to have spoken English.

Two months after the attack in Karbala, Qais Qazali, who leads the League of the Righteous, his brother Laith, and a senior Hezbollah military commander known as Musa Ali Daqduq were all captured during a raid in Basra. Qais and Laith were freed by the US in 2009 along with hundreds of members of the Asaib al Haq, in exchange for Peter Moore, a captured British hostage, and the remains of four Brits who were kidnapped and subsequently executed by the group. The US justified their release by claiming that the League of the Righteous was reconciling with the Iraqi government. After his release, Qais threatened to attack US interests in Iraq.

Trained by Iran, Hezbollah

Daqduq, who previously served as the head of Hezbollah's special forces as well as the commander of Hassan Nasrallah's guard, was listed by the US as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in November 2012, less than a year after he was released from US custody. Daqduq was released to Iraqi custody in December 2011 as the US withdrew from Iraq with the promise that he would be tried for his war crimes. But in 2012, he was freed by the Iraqi government. US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said that Daqduq is involved with supporting Iraqi militias who are fighting in Syria.

In its designation of Daqduq as a global terrorist in November 2012, the US Treasury Department said that sometime in 2005, "Iran asked Hezbollah to form a group to train Iraqis to fight Coalition Forces in Iraq." The designation stated: "In response, Hassan Nasrallah [Hezbollah's leader] established a covert Hezbollah unit to train and advise Iraqi militants in Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) [or Mahdi Army] and JAM Special Groups, now known as Asaib Ahl al Haq [the League of the Righteous]," a Mahdi Army faction.

"As of 2006, Daqduq had been ordered by Hezbollah to work with IRGC-QF [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force] to provide training and equipment to JAM Special Groups to augment their ability to inflict damage against US troops," Treasury continued.

Three top leaders of the League of the Righteous are also on the US' list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

Abu Dura, whose real name is Ismail Hafiz al Lami, is known as the "Shia Zarqawi" for his propensity to torture his captives. He was listed as a global terrorist in January 2008along with Ahmad Foruzandeh, the former commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, for supporting the Iraqi insurgency.

Also designated with Abu Dura and Foruzandeh was Mustafa al Sheibani, who led the so-called Sheibani Network, which is part of the League of the Righteous.

Both Abu Dura and Sheibani are believed to have returned to Iraq in the summer of 2010. [See LWJ reports, Iran sends another dangerous Shia terror commander back to Iraq and'Shiite Zarqawi' returns to Baghdad from Iran: report.]

Akram Abbas al Kabi, the current military commander of the League of the Righteous who served as the group's leader while Qazali was in US custody, was added to the list of global terrorists in September 2008. Also designated with Kabi was Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran's Qods Force who was involved in the planning and execution of the attack on the Karbala Joint Provincial Coordination Center. [ See LWJ report, US sanctions Iranian general for aiding Iraqi terror groups.]

Kabi directed attacks against US and Iraqi forces during the so-called Mahdi cease-fire imposed by Sadr in the spring of 2008. He provided weapons "for large-scale military operations against Coalition Forces" in early 2008. Kabi likely aided the Mahdi Army and other Shia terror groups in attacking US and Iraqi troops as they built the security barrier around a large segment of Sadr City. More than 1,000 Mahdi Army fighters were killed during the fighting in Baghdad from April until the Mahdi Army quit the fight in June of that year.

The Iraqi government, which targeted the Special Groups, including the League of the Righteous, in military operations from 2007 to 2009, began to soften its stance on the Iranian-backed groups as the US government and military began disengaging from Iraq. Then as the Syrian civil war heated up and the Islamic State of Iraq began regaining its strength, the government began to rely on the Shia militias to provide security in Shia areas. And as the Iraqi military melted away in the Islamic State's June offensive in Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Diyala provinces, the Shia militias, including League of the Righteous, were critical in propping up Iraq's security forces.

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After the captured of Tabqa airbase in Syria by the Islamic State last week a number of photographs were posted online showing the weapons captured at the airbase. These included many weapons seen elsewhere in the conflict, from ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons to Konkurs ATGMs.

Today, a new video released by the Islamic State shows more of the airbase, and the equipment captured. Again, much of what is shown are weapons seen elsewhere in the conflict, but 6 minutes into the video something not yet seen in the conflict is shown.

So without prior knowledge of what this item could be, how to we identify what it is? In this case we have quite a few clues clearly visible thanks to the markings on the case. First, we can see the word “panzerabwehr”, which we can quickly Google Translate to “anti-tank defense”.

We can also see a measurement, 136mm, above that, and in this instance it’s actually possible to find an ID with just that information.

If you Google both words, “panzerabwehr 136mm”, and check the image search results you’ll see the following images.

On the right side of the top row and left side of the bottom row there’s two pictures that are very similar to what we can see in the video. In this case, both pictures lead to the same page, a German message board where someone is trying to sell a missile case. The message reads in Google Translated German

Hello,
sell this handy container of LFK HOT, ground target / anti-tank.
Container is water-tight sealing, painted sheet steel, 136cm long and 25x25cm in cross section, about 15-20kg difficult.
All ends and Did are Rubber armored.
Sell only to Pick Up , shipping is too expensive !!
Price: 40, – Greeting Frank

The page also contains images that show similar markings to what we can see in the Islamic State video, such as DM 72, 136mm, and panzerabwehr

If we Google “LFK HOT” the first result is the Wikipedia page for the HOT missile, a missile made jointly by the French and Germans that can be used by ground vehicles and aircraft, including French Gazelle helicopters sold to Syria in the 80s. It’s actually possible to make out “HOT” on the top row of markings visible in the Islamic State video, and “Lenkflugkörper” (German for guided missile) is abbreviated to LFK.

The next questions to investigate is whether or not the platforms for launching these missiles are at the airbase, and whether or not they are able to be launched from improvised launchers. Based on the Islamic States previous track record for publicizing their activities, if the answer is yes to those questions it seems likely we’ll see that soon enough.

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New evidence has been found that shows the Buk missile system that was used to shoot down MH17 on July 17 came from Russia and was most likely operated by Russian soldiers. Using videos posted by locals in Russia’s Belgorod region back in June it has been possible to identify the Buk missile launcher seen in Ukraine on July 17 as part of a convoy of Buk missile launchers. It has also been possible to identify the Russian brigade the Buk is likely to have belonged to, and who may have operated the Buk missile launcher when it was in Ukraine.

The Buk launcher can be identified because of a number of features, including white markings on the left side side of its chassis, and what looks like the traces of a number that has been painted over. Here is a comparison of the Buk seen in previously unpublicized video taken in Russia on June 23 with a well-known image from Paris Match, which shows a Buk in Donetsk at 9 a.m. on July 17.

On the left: the Buk in a column of Russian military vehicles seen on the evening on June 23 on the motorway from Staryy Oskol to the OEMK steel works in the Belgorod area. [Source]  On the Right: Image from Paris Match. [Source]

The above picture with the contrast boosted showing a third matching marking.

Numerous earlier studies of vehicles inside Ukraine have shown it has been standard practice for Russian forces to paint over the numbers on their vehicles before sending them into the Ukraine. In the Paris Match image, much of the remaining number has now been painted over. However, it is still possible to see the top curve of what was a “2” and the other two white marks. It’s important to note that these markings are in exactly the same positions on the Buk in both images.

Here is a comparison of the Paris Match picture with an image of the same Buk in a convoy of Russian military vehicles in Alexeyevka, a town about 70 miles from Staryy Oskol, on June 24.

Left: Same Paris Match image as above. On the right: image from a video taken near the Magnit store in Alexeyevka, Russia on June 24. [Source]The above image also shows the matching marks on the left side of the Buk. It’s also possible to confirm that this is the same Buk by looking at the other side of the vehicle. The Buk seen moving back to the Russian border on the 17th has a white patch on the armored skirt of its right side. This patch is also visible in a video filmed around Staryy Oskol in Russia, which was uploaded on June 23.

On the left: an image from a video widely spread in the wake of the MH17 tragedy. [Source] On the right: another unpublicized video from around Staryy Oskol uploaded on June 23. [Source]The videos of the convoy of Russian vehicles in June shows a number of Buks are part of the convoy. However, keeping track of the one with with the markings that match those seen in Ukraine in July is simple, as only three Buks in the column do not have railings on the back of their turrets.

Here is an image to illustrate what these railing look like, and what the Buk looks like without them; the top image is one of the systems seen in the Alexeyevka video, on the bottom is an image of the Buk that is suspected of being used to shoot down MH17, filmed in Staryy Oskol.

The top image is an example of a Buk with railings. [Source] Bottom image: the Buk with the markings outside of Staryy Oskol. [Source]Out of the Buk launchers in the column filmed in Russia in late June, three are without railings on back of the turret. Two out of these three have identification numbers on the side; Nos. 231 and 232. Buk No. 231 can be ruled out as the Buk in the July videos and in photos has completely different markings on its right side and does not have a patch of white on its right skirt.

Buk 231 with a diamond-shaped marking and no white patch. [Source]The below images show that the Buk that was filmed in Luhansk after the attack does not have the railing on the back of its turret.

Furthermore, the fact that it was heading toward the Ukranian border in the weeks prior to the attack on the airliner means that it is possible to conclude that the Buk seen in Russia was the Buk that was smuggled into Ukraine and used to shoot down MH17.

It’s also possible to determine which Russian unit the Buk is likely to belong to by examining the vehicles in the column.  The videos of the convoy travelling to Ukraine show that the vehicles have area code “50” on their registration plates, which indicates that they belong to the Moscovskiy Voenniy Okrug (MVO) or the Moscow Military District.

The area code “50” is visible on the registration plates of the vehicles in a video taken in the Krasneyskiy area on the morning of June 24.

Truck in the convoy heading to Alexeyevka on June 24 (Note: the timestamp on the video is wrong). [Source]The dashcam recording appears to have a date/timestamp error and reads “2011.01.01.” This is clearly wrong for numerous reasons, including that the summer weather in the video is radically different from the Staryy Oskol area in winter and that the exact same vehicles are visible in multiple videos; see the white minibus here, here and here at 0:54.

A resident of Staryy Oskol also confirmed that the registration numbers on the vehicles in the convoy had the “50” code. The user rokerrson posted on instagram on June 23: [Source]

This evening, a column of military hardware passed through our city, which included, mobile RLS [radar], ZRK [air-defense missile system] Buk (if correctly identified), a bunch of tented Urals and other vehicles, generally around 80-100 units in total, including a field kitchen and refueling trucks. Presumably, these are troops of the CVO [Central Military District] on exercises and they moved in the direction of the Ukrainian border with the Belgorod region.

Later, the poster added the following: “correction with the CVO… vehicles with Moscow numbers (50 rus).”

The Moscow Military District has two anti-aircraft missile brigades that are specially outfitted with Buk systems. These are the 5th Zrbr “Buk,” which is based in Shuya and the 53rd Zrbr “Buk,” which is based in Kursk. The 5th brigade can be ruled out because according to multiple sources it has been moved out of the Moscow Military District and into the Western Military District, and is now headquartered in St Petersburg, where it uses the “43” area code on its vehicles.

As Kursk is relatively close to Staryy Oskol it makes sense that the convoy was comprised of the 53rd brigade and departed from its base at V/Ch (Military Unit) 32406. This is also confirmed by the earliest video of the convoy, taken during in the morning or afternoon of June 23, which shows the vehicles driving away from Kursk and in the direction of Kharkiv. It is therefore likely that the Buk belongs to the 53rd brigade from Kursk.

Moreover, it also appears the 53rd “Buk” brigade not only uses the “50” area code on its registration plates, but that its troops have uploaded pictures of some of the same vehicles that can been seen in the videos taken around Staryy Oskol. Here are two photos of the same truck, the first image is from the video in the Krasneyskiy area and the second was uploaded by Ivan Krasnoproshin who serves in the 53rd brigade.

On the left: a truck in the convoy to Alexeyevka on June 24. [Source] On the right, the same truck photographed by Sergeant Ivan Krasnoproshin of the 53rd “Buk” brigade in Kursk. The license plate reads “0639АН50”. [Source]

Here are pictures of a Buk Snow Drift Radar unit. The first was uploaded by Kranoproshin in 2013, and the second is from the video of the convoy in Alexeyevka.

The third vehicle from the left is a Snow Drift Radar that can be used as part of the Buk system. The number on the side reads “201”. [Source]A Snow Drift Radar with identification number “201” in Alexeyevka on July 24. [Source]Krasnoproshin inside one of the unit’s vehicles. The chevrons indicate that he is a sergeant. [Source]The following picture shows Krasnoproshin at the headquarters of military unit 32406, note the missiles in background that are displayed for show on the parade ground.

Ivan Krosnoproshin at the parade ground of the 53rd brigade on July 22, 2012 [Source]The following image shows the parade ground of the 53rd brigade from above; the same missiles are visible on the south side of the parade ground.

The missiles in the image above confirm Krasnoproshin’s location in the earlier photo. [Source]The following is a satellite view of the 53rd brigade’s vehicle park:This image suggests that the large number of vehicles seen in the column in June probably came from the 53rd brigade. The brigade itself is part of the Russian Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona (PVO), or Anti-Aircraft Defense troops. As a unit specially supplied and trained to use the Buk, the 53rd brigade had both the ability and the means to shoot down MH17 on July 17.

The Buk that was seen leaving the suspected area of the missile launch on July 17 most likely belonged to and was manned by Russian troops from the 53rd Kursk Brigade. The new information presented in this article adds to the existing evidence that the Russian government bears responsibility for the tragedy.

SEE ALSO: Six Months On, Families Cling To Grim Reminders Of Malaysia's Missing Flight MH370

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National Security Advisor Susan Rice is in China this week, discussing recent sticking-points in trans-Pacific relations with her counterparts in Beijing, chief among them a mid-August confrontation between a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea.

There's a lot for U.S. and Chinese security officials to talk through, from problematic Chinese territorial claims to alleged state-backed hacking of American government computer systems. One item that could be on the menu for the talks has to do with a newly-confirmed Chinese missile technology that could target American assets. 

Back in March, Chinese officials confirmed the existence of the DF-26c, a road-mobile mid-range ballistic missile that can fire at targets of up to 3,500 kilometers with greater precision than any other comparable Chinese-made system. As an analysis on the military affairs website Strategy Page noted on September 8th, that puts U.S. bases in Guam within range of one of China's most advanced weapons.

Strategy Page's analysis doesn't conclude there are Chinese DF-26c batteries aimed at U.S. assets — it specifically notes China, like most countries, doesn't reveal who it's targeting with its ballistic missiles at any given time. However, the DF-26c has certain advantages over the rest of the Chinese arsenal. It's truck-mounted, and runs off of efficient, easily-stored, and relatively non-volatile solid-state rocket fuel. The DF-26c can be fueled quickly and covertly — in a way that wouldn't tip off western intelligence agencies as quickly or as obviously as launch preparations for other, earlier Chinese ballistic missiles.

Strategy Page also notes much of China's longer-range arsenal has various problems with age, maintenance, or general reliability. The DF-26C has apparently been in service for several years prior to official confirmation of its existence, and it represents a general improvement over its predecessors.

Most importantly, the entire DF-26 series can strike beyond the "second island chain," a Chinese phrase for the islands on the outer edge of the disputed South China Sea, like the Japanese-claimed Senkaku, or even the Philippines. As this last 2013 video from China's Hubei Television demonstrates, that range includes Guam as well:

Of course, there's no indication China has any intention of unleashing a rocket barrage at one of the most important U.S. Naval bases in the Pacific. But high-tech mid-range weapons like the DF-26c are part of a Chinese defense strategy aimed at modernizing its ballistic arsenal while deterring overly aggressive U.S. moves in its backyard, an approach explained in a 2013 Congressional Research Service Report.

Like the near-collision over the South China Sea, the DF-26c is a reminder of the complications of the U.S.'s ongoing pivot to Asia. The U.S. is focusing military and diplomatic assets on what policymakers believe will become the most important region in the world — while leaving itself open to frequent and potentially hazardous confrontation with the world's rising superpower in the process.

SEE ALSO: China is developing some alarming high-tech weapons systems

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The following video shows a Syrian Mil Mi-8 Hip helicopter being destroyed by a Kornet ATGM reportedly fired by Sham Legion’ brigade militants at an airbase near Idlib.

From a spot located just outside the airbase perimeter fence, the militants wait until the chopper is standing still on the ground to fire the ATGM and destroy it: as lethal as a SAM (Surface to Air Missile)/MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System).

SEE ALSO: Expert: More Than 12,000 Foreign Fighters From 74 Countries Went To Syria

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Israel and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency tested an improved Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile at an Israeli test range over the Mediterranean Sea Tuesday, the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

“An Arrow 2 missile was launched and performed its flight sequence as planned. The results are being analyzed by program engineers,” the statement read.

Defense Ministry spokesperson Jonathan Mosery said that the Arrow 2 system, which has been operational for years and is intended for use against long-range threats, “like Iron Dome, undergoes ongoing improvements” to software and hardware and other components.

Israel is in the process of developing a five-tiered system of air defense, offering protection against projectiles ranging from mortars to ballistic weapons. (See video of the Arrow 2 in flight below).

Of the two operational systems, only Iron Dome has been used in combat. Defending against short-to-mid-range rockets, it intercepted roughly 90 percent of its targeted projectiles during Operation Protective Edge, according to figures released by the army.

The other three systems — Iron Beam, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 — are expected to become operational within the coming two years.

The Arrow 2 was rolled out in March 2000. “This is a great day for the Air Defense Forces, for the Air Force, the defense establishment and, I would say, for the State of Israel,” Maj. Gen. Eitan Ben Eliyahu said at the time.

He called the Arrow 2 “the only weapon system of its kind in the entire world,” adding that Israel is the first country to “succeed in developing, building and operating a defense system against ballistic missiles.”

Tuesday’s test, the Defense Ministry said, has no bearing “on the Israeli operational systems’ capability to cope with the existing threats in the region” and is merely “intended to counter future threats.”

The Arrow 3, still incomplete, is designed to intercept missiles at a higher altitude, in space and above the earth’s atmosphere, minimizing the threat of fallout from weapons of mass destruction and increasing the likelihood of a successful interception of incoming missiles.

SEE ALSO: China has a new high-tech missile that can reach a major U.S. base in Guam

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North Korea appears to be developing a new weapons system capable of launching submarine-based ballistic missiles, the South's defence ministry said Monday.

"Based on recent US and South Korean intelligence, we have detected signs of North Korea developing a vertical missile launch tube for submarines," a ministry official told AFP.

Ministry spokesman Kim Min-Seok told a regular press briefing Monday that the North's 3,000-ton Golf-class submarine could be modified to fire medium-range ballistic missiles.

"However, there is no confirmed information yet that a North Korean submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles is in operation," Kim stressed.

North Korea's small submarine fleet is comprised of largely obsolete Soviet-era and modified Chinese vessels.

The US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University said in June that North Korea appeared to have acquired a sea-based copy of a Russian cruise missile.

Arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis of the US think-tank said the missile would mark "a new and potentially destabilizing addition" to North Korea's military arsenal.

He identified the weapon as a copy of the Russian-produced KH-35 -- a sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile developed during the 1980s and 90s.

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Top U.S. military contractor Lockheed Martin Corp. is putting a full-court press on the international missile-defense market. While the Pentagon remains the company's primary buyer of antimissile weapons, foreign customers are being actively pursued.

U.S. antimissile and antiaircraft weapons used to be regarded as gee-whiz technology, but they are now a mature market. Foreign buyers want missile shields to ward off attacks but also see these programs as a source of economic development. 

Making U.S. weaponry more attractive to international buyers now requires novel industrial partnerships and co-production agreements. Export incentives are key to winning deals, said Richard McDaniel, vice president of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 programs at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control.

The pressure is on at Lockheed Martin to step up non-U.S. business. CEO Marillyn A. Hewson has challenged the company to raise foreign sales from 17 percent to 20 percent of total revenues over the next year. While the F-35 joint strike fighter is expected to become Lockheed's largest international moneymaker, some of the most promising overseas opportunities are in missile defense.

Within Lockheed Martin's $8 billion a year Missiles and Fire Control, 33 percent of sales are to foreign buyers, and the goal is to reach 40 percent by 2016.

The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 — an interceptor missile used with the Patriot air defense system — is now sold to seven countries. The company soon will reach a major milestone when its 2,000th missile comes off the line this fall. Foreign buyers include the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan and Kuwait. An eighth customer, Qatar, is expected to sign an order soon, McDaniel said Sept. 23 at a news conference in Washington, D.C.

Lockheed is pushing its MEADS medium extended air defense system — a tri-nation program funded by the United States, Germany and Italy — in Poland and Turkey. Both nations are being aggressively courted by suppliers as they weigh the deployment of a regional missile shield. In Poland and Turkey, Lockheed is sweetening its offers with opportunities for local firms to partake in the production. These deals are estimated to be worth $10 billion and $4 billion, respectively. 

Turkey a year ago selected China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corp. to supply its missile shield. The French-Italian contractor Eurosam and U.S. contractor Raytheon Co. came in second and third. The Turkish government, under pressure from NATO officials, decided to reconsider and is now reviewing a new round of bids.

"It's very important for these countries to add domestic opportunities," McDaniel said of both Turkey and Poland. A win in Poland would be a boon for Lockheed's MEADS as the U.S. military decided not to field the system and ended its involvement in the program in 2013.

In Japan, Lockheed has had a long-term agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for coproduction of PAC-3. The country also is codeveloping a new version of the U.S. Navy's Standard missile with prime contractor Raytheon.

This partnering model is being considered for other countries, said McDaniel. "We work to come up with industrial sharing opportunities."

Lockheed expects to increase foreign sales of its terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) theater air and missile defense system that the U.S. Army has deployed around the world. THAAD interceptor number 100 will come off the line before the end of the year, said McDaniel. The UAE last year became the first foreign buyer when it signed a $3.4 billion contract. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have "expressed interest," he said. "We expect deals."

Lockheed gets a great deal of marketing help from the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, which advocates independently for American weaponry. MDA benefits from foreign deals because it helps keep U.S. contractors' manufacturing lines in business when Pentagon orders dwindle.

"We work together with them," Thomas J. Oles, vice president of strategy and business development at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, told National Defense in June. "With MDA, it's a partnership when we go internationally. They've been a really strong partner with us."

Oles said Japan is considering buying THAAD as one piece of a wider missile shield it would build to thwart ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. The shield would include the naval Aegis air-defense system, THAAD and PAC-3. "As more countries look to establish their own capability, it's a logical next step to integrate," Oles said.

International growth, too, is expected for the Navy's Aegis combat system as a ballistic missile defense option that can be deployed at sea or ashore. "We have two dozen international partners," said Mike Salvato, Lockheed's senior manager of Maritime Integrated Air and Missile Defense. Although the system is already three decades old, it is gaining new relevance with features such as "engage on remote," and "launch on remote," Salvato said at the news conference. That means commanders on ships or on land, for instance, can share target data and launch weapons based on cues from other parts of the grid. "There is a marriage of ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare in the traditional approach," Salvato said. The first Aegis ashore system is now being built in Romania as part of the U.S.-funded European missile shield. 

Naval analyst Ron O'Rourke, of the Congressional Research Service, said Aegis is benefitting from countries' desires to deploy collective missile shields for regional defense. "The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly," he wrote in a recent CRS report. "Governments that have made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on inwardly focused national interests have discovered that their investments also enable them to combine their resources in collective defense." This started with the Aegis sale to Japan, and then expanded to relationships with Australia and South Korea, and now includes a commercial connection with Spain as well as an enterprise between Norway and Spain. Several other nations have expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis weapon system and Aegis BMD, O'Rourke said. "Australia and other countries that are acquiring the Aegis system are stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability of adding BMD in the future."

Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, commander of U.S. Army Pacific, said allied countries in the region plan to “integrate” existing air and missile defense systems, rather than have them operate in isolation. “We have adversaries who are increasing their missile stocks on hand, their surface-to-surface fire, causing danger to the region,” he said in 2013. “There is increasing demand for integrated air and missile defense.”

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The United States plans to sell Patriot missile batteries to Saudi Arabia worth $1.75 billion and long-range artillery to the United Arab Emirates valued at about $900 million, the Pentagon said Wednesday.

The Defense Department informed Congress of the potential arms sales this week as fighter jets from both of the Gulf states took part in a US-led air campaign against the Islamic State (IS) group in Iraq and Syria.

The Saudi government had requested the purchase of 202 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles — the most sophisticated version of the Patriot anti-missile weapons — as well as a flight test target, telemetry kits and other related equipment, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in a statement.

“The proposed sale will help replenish Saudi’s current Patriot missiles which are becoming obsolete and difficult to sustain due to age and the limited availability of repair parts,” the agency said.

“The program will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a partner which has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East,” it added.

Both Kuwait and Qatar already have purchased the PAC-3 weapons, which are designed to knock out incoming ballistic missiles as well as enemy aircraft and cruise missiles using ground radar.

Gulf countries in recent years have invested heavily in missile defense weapons, radar as well as air power, mainly as a hedge against Iran which they view as a regional threat.

The Patriot missiles, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, have an estimated range of up to 300 kilometers (186 miles) and have more advanced radar than the older systems.

Separately, the Defense Department notified lawmakers about a planned sale of 12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers to the United Arab Emirates for nearly one billion dollars.

The system “will improve the UAE’s capability to meet current and future threats and provide greater security for its critical infrastructure,” the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said. The weapons, which deliver precise and powerful artillery fire at a long range, would also bolster the UAE military’s ability to operate with US forces, it said.

Congress has 30 days to raise objections to the potential arms sales. Without any move to block the deals, the US government can then negotiate contracts with the two countries.

SEE ALSO: Why Saddam Hussein was worse than anyone in the Middle East today

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Iran’s rocket and missile forces serve a wide range of strategic objectives.

Iran’s forces include relatively short-range artillery rockets that support its ground forces and limit the need for close air support — along with long-range missiles that can reach any target in the region. Tehran is also developing booster systems that might give Iran the ability to strike at targets throughout Europe or even reach the US.

Iran’s rocket and missile forces are steadily evolving. The lethality of most current systems is limited by a reliance on conventional warheads, poor accuracy, and uncertain reliability.

But Iran is developing upgraded guidance systems and is attempting to improve the lethality of its conventional warheads. The country has also at least studied arming its missiles with nuclear warheads.

A new study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies assesses Iran’s programs in the context of the overall limits to the country's conventional forces, air power, and air defenses. The report explains why Iran has placed such a heavy emphasis on artillery, rockets, and missiles as a way of compensating for the shortcomings in its conventional forces — and as a way of increasing Tehran's irregular capabilities in the process.

At the same time, the report examines why Iran’s missile forces now have critical limits in their lethality. It also looks at Iran’s incentives for fitting their missiles with nuclear and precision-conventional warheads.

The study shows why placing clear limits on Iran’s ability to arm such missiles with nuclear warheads is a critical part of any meaningful nuclear agreement with Iran,  and why the US and Iran’s neighbors must prepare suitable deterrents and defenses to deal with Iran’s efforts upgrade its longer-range conventionally armed missiles.

Read the whole report here.

SEE ALSO: India just successfully tested a nuclear-capable cruise missile

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As China continues its rise to superpower stature, Beijing is trying to rapidly increase its firepower.

China's attempts to seriously upgrade its military — with next-generation fighter jets, ballistic missiles, and advanced naval vessels — is partly aimed at keeping pace with the US.

The two are in a veritable arms race in east Asia. The US engaged in a "pivot to Asia," focusing military and diplomatic attention on an increasingly important part of the world.

Meanwhile, China is trying to expand its territorial reach into the South China Sea, an effort that's already bringing Beijing into conflict with US allies like Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

And China is constantly building its military with a possible invasion of Taiwan in mind.

Already, China has become the world's second-largest military spender, right behind the US. Since 1995, China has increased its defense budget by 500% in real terms. 

Although China's military has a ways to go before it is qualitatively, or even quantitatively, a match for the US, the country's rise has been notable, and counts as one of the major geo-strategic developments of this decade. 

Chengdu J-20

The Chengdu J-20 is China's fifth-generation fighter, its response to the US F-35 and the Russian T-50. The J-20 is a stealth aircraft that is currently in its fourth round of prototypes. 

The J-20 bears striking resemblance to the F-35 and the F-22, likely due to data theft and Chinese imitation of the skeletons of both planes. China may have the design specifications needed to give the J-20 stealth capabilities that are on par with the F-35. 

Although the plane is estimated to have a striking range of 1,000 nautical miles, the aircraft itself is still reliant upon Russian engines and in a relatively early stage of its development.

Shenyang J-31

The Shenyang J-31 is the other fifth-generation aircraft that China is currently developing.

Unlike the J-20, which is heavily based on stolen American plans, the J-31 boasts an indigenous design. The plane is about the same size as the F-35, but has a smaller weapons bay — giving the J-31 improved fuel efficiency and speed. 

The J-31 is also designed to be deployable to China's planned fleet of aircraft carriers. It would join the F-35 as the only two carrier-based stealth fighters in the world. 

The J-31 is scheduled to make its public debut at China's largest commercial and defense airshow in Zhuhai in early November.

Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark

The Shenyang J-15 is a carrier-based fighter aircraft that debuted in 2009. In a 2014 report to Congress, the Pentagon noted that the Fying Shark was conducting full-stops and takeoffs from China's Liaoning aircraft carrier with full weapons payloads. 

When based on the ground, the J-15 should have a combat radius of about 1,200 kilometers. However, since the Liaoning does not provide a useful catapult launch, the aircraft will have a reduced combat radius while operating at sea, the Pentagon reported. 

The Chinese-produced J-15 is based on designs of the Russian Sukhoi Su-33. The plane is a Russian-type design fitted with Chinese radar, engines, and weapons. 

Russia has test-fired a Sineva intercontinental ballistic missile from a submarine in the Barents Sea as part of tests on the reliability of the navy's strategic forces.

The Russian Defense Ministry said the liquid-fuelled missile, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, was fired by the submarine "Tula" and targeted a testing range in the Kamchatka region on the Pacific Ocean.

The Sineva, which has a range of about 12,000 kilometers, became operable in 2007 as part of Moscow's efforts to shore up Russia's nuclear deterrent.

This test firing was the second ICBM launch from a Russian nuclear submarine in the past week.

President Vladimir Putin has underlined the importance of the nuclear deterrent during Moscow's standoff with the West over the Ukraine crisis.

Based on reporting by Reuters and TASS.

SEE ALSO: These Chinese military advancements are shifting the balance of power in Asia

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This report analyses evidence from open sources, in particular social media, relating to the Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed in eastern Ukraine on July 17th that many have linked to the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.

While other open source information is available on other aspects of the downing of MH17, the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team believes that this particular investigation provides solid information about the origin and movements of the Buk filmed and photographed on July 17th.

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team also believes that many of the unresolved questions about the downing of MH17 will be answered by the official investigation, and our investigation was made possible by the examination of open source material overlooked by other organisations.

The report is split into three sections. The first examines the open source evidence relating to the movements of the Buk in eastern Ukraine on July 17th, the second presents evidence that the Buk filmed and photographed on July 17th originated in Russia and was part of a convoy headed towards the Ukrainian border in late June, and the third looks at the activity of vehicles seen in the same convoy after July 17th.

It is the opinion of the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team that there is undeniable evidence that separatists in Ukraine were in control of a Buk missile launcher on July 17th and transported it from Donetsk to Snizhne on a transporter. The Buk missile launcher was unloaded in Snizhne approximately three hours before the downing of MH17 and was later filmed minus one missile driving through separatist-controlled Luhansk.

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team also believes the same Buk was part of a convoy travelling from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk to near the Ukrainian border as part of a training exercise between June 22nd and July 25th, with elements of the convoy separating from the main convoy at some point during that period, including the Buk missile launcher filmed in Ukraine on July 17th. There is strong evidence indicating that the Russian military provided separatists in eastern Ukraine with the Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed in eastern Ukraine on July 17th.

A PDF version of this report is available – Origin of the Separatists’ Buk A Bellingcat Investigation.

Explore a map showing the separatists’ Buk and June and July convoys in Russia here.

Section One: The July 17 Buk

In the aftermath of the downing of MH17, photographs and videos were posted on social media sites claiming to show a Buk missile launcher in areas close to the MH17 crash site. Using a variety of tools and techniques, the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has been able to establish the exact location at which these images were recorded and the approximate time that many of the images were recorded. Based on this information, the investigation team has mapped the route of the Buk missile launcher through separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine on July 17th.

Donetsk

On July 25th, the weekly magazine Paris Match published a photograph of a Buk missile launcher being transported on a low-loader truck through the separatist-controlled city of Donetsk. The location of the photograph wasprecisely located, showing an eastward direction of travel along the H21 motorway.

Inquiries by Storyful with Paris Match established that the photograph was taken at “about 11 am on the morning of July 17.” Shadows cast by the vehicle are consistent with this time of day. Paris Match also confirmed this was the best quality version of the image available. A Twitter post from 12:32PM (local time) on July 17 reports the sighting of a Buk at the intersection of Shakhtostroiteley Boulevard and Ilych Avenue heading east in the direction of Makiivka. This tweet supports the location and route provided by the Paris Match photograph. Using the phone number on the side of the low-loader truck, Paris Match contacted the owner of the company, who claimed the truck had been stolen by separatists and that the vehicle was unique in the region.

Zuhres and Shakhtarsk

On July 17th a video was uploaded to YouTube showing the Buk photographed in Donetsk travelling through the town of Zuhres, approximately 36 kilometers east along H21 from the location in the Paris Match image. Using information provided with the video, it was possible to find the exact location the video was filmed, the H21 motorway running through Zuhres, and to show the Buk missile launcher continued to travel east. It was also claimed in a now-deleted Tweet that the video was filmed at around 11:40am, although it has not been possible to verify that time with available information. A tweet posted at 12:41PM (Kyiv time) reports that three tanks and a Buk covered in netting passed by Shakhtarsk, a city that lies east of Zuhres and west of Torez, connected by the H21 motorway.

Torez

The above image was shared widely during the evening of July 17th. The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has been unable to find any earlier example of the photograph being shared than a post made by a user of the Russian social media site VKontakte (VK) at 8:09pm (Kyiv time) on July 17th. The investigation team suspects that the image was originally posted in the “Overheard in Torez” VKontakte page, but has since been deleted. It was again possible to find the exact location the photograph was taken, and using shadows visible in the image it was estimated the time the photograph was taken was approximately 12:30pm.

This time is supported by posts made on Twitter and VKontakte from locals who reporting seeing a convoy of military vehicles moving eastward through Torez towards Snizhne during the early afternoon. Three tweets that describe the missile launcher and an accompanying convoy travelling through Torez were posted at 12:07pm, 12:15pm, and 12:26pm local time. Others on VKontakte report that the convoy included three tanks, with posts at 1:14PM and 2:14PM that confirm the information was posted on Twitter before the downing of MH17.

Along with these eyewitness reports, journalists have since visited the city and received confirmation of the convoy sightings on July 17. Journalists from theGuardian and Buzzfeed visited Torez on July 22nd and interviewed locals who confirmed both the time and route the Buk missile launcher took through Torez on the way to Snizhne along the H21 motorway.

Snizhne

A photograph and video posted on Twitter and YouTube showed a Buk missile launcher in the town of Snizhne. Unlike previous images and video, the Buk was not shown on a low-loader truck, but moving under its own power. The location shown in the video was precisely located and showed the Buk heading south out of Snizhne. The photograph was also located to 13a Karapetyan Street, less than 1 kilometer northwest of the location on the video. Based on the shadows in the photograph, the photograph was taken at approximately 1:30PM.

The AP reported on August 25th that “On July 17, AP reporters in the town of Snizhne saw a tracked launcher with four SA-11 surface-to-air missiles parked on a street. The bulky missile system is also known as a Buk M-1. Three hours later, people six miles (10 kilometers) west of Snizhne heard loud noises and then saw the wreckage and bodies from Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 fall from the sky.” Three hours prior to the time MH17 was downed was 1:20pm local time, supporting the time indicated by the shadows in the Snizhne photograph.

Luhansk

The final video was posted online by the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior on July 18. In this video, the Buk missile launcher is back on the low-loader truck, but is now missing at least one missile. The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed in a press conference on July 21 that this video was in fact filmed in Ukrainian government-controlled territory, stating that the “media circulated a video supposedly showing a Buk system being moved from Ukraine to Russia. This is clearly a fabrication. This video was made in the town of Krasnoarmeysk, as evidenced by the billboard you see in the background, advertising a car dealership at 34 Dnepropetrovsk Street. Krasnoarmeysk has been controlled by the Ukrainian military since May 11.”

However, investigations by Bellingcat have shown this statement from the Russian Ministry of Defence to be untrue, and it has been possible to find the exact location in the separatist-held area of Luhansk where this video was filmed. While it is not possible to discern the exact time this video was filmed, there are three pieces of evidence that lend credence to the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior’s claim that the video was filmed on the early morning of July 18:

• The video was filmed approximately 75 kilometers north of Snizhne.
• At least one missile is missing from the set of four missiles that the Buk missile launcher is normally armed with. Additionally, the photograph of the Buk missile launcher in Torez shows four missiles, and local witnesses noted that the Buk missile launcher moving through Torez had four missiles.
• The netting visible in the photograph from Torez is absent from the top of the missiles in Luhansk.

The Low-Loader Truck

Throughout the sequence of videos and photographs showing the Buk missile launcher in eastern Ukraine, it is clear the same low-loader truck is being used, and the vehicle has been described as unique by its owner. From the available evidence, it is clear that the separatists have used the same low-loader to move military vehicles on occasions after July 17.

On August 6th 2014, a photographed was shared online showing the low-loader truck carrying a military vehicle through the town of Makiivka, just east of Donetsk. While the board with the phone number painted onto it was removed, it is still a clear match to the same vehicle used on July 17.

By examining historical satellite map imagery of the vehicle rental site that the low-loader truck was taken from, it is possible to identify a red low-loader with a white cabin, only one of which is ever present at the site. By comparing satellite map imagery from July 24, 2014 and August 9, 2014, it is clear that the low-loader truck was moved during that period, which would fit with it being used elsewhere on August 6.

On August 26, 2014 a photograph and video of an identical low-loader truck were posted online. The video featured a woman who had appeared in previous separatist-filmed videos, and it appears the low-loader truck was being used to transport a damaged vehicle.

Conclusion

Based on the available information, it appears clear to the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team that separatists transported a Buk missile system through their territory on July 17, and used the same low-loader truck used to transport the Buk missile system on July 17 on at least two occasions in August. The Buk missile system was unloaded in Snizhne and was then transported on the same low-loader truck to separatist-controlled Luhansk, now missing at least one missile.

Section Two: The June Convoy and “Buk 3×2”

In late June 2014, a convoy left the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade near Kursk, and travelled to the Ukrainian border, officially as part of a training exercise. Using a wide variety of open sources, it has been possible for the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team to collect evidence of the movements of the convoy, the purpose of the convoy, its links to the 53rd Brigade, and evidence that confirms that one of the Buk missile launchers in the convoy was the same Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed in Ukraine on July 17, 2014, travelling from Donetsk to Luhansk through separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine.

The Convoy

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has collected 16 videos posted on social media sites including VKontakte, YouTube, Instagram, and Odnoklassniki that show the 53rd Brigade’s convoy moving from Kursk on June 23rd to Millerovo on June 25th. The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has also been able to identify the exact location at which each video was filmed and, by matching vehicles visible in different videos, to confirm that all these 16 videos show the same convoy.

It was also possible to find a local news report about the movement of the convoy, which included images of vehicles from the same convoy. According to the report locals who spoke to soldiers in the convoy, they were “being sent to the border with Ukraine to ‘strengthen border control.’”

It was also possible to link the convoy to the 53rd Brigade using social media posts by members of the 53rd Brigade. For example, this post by a member of the Brigade, Vasily Ilyin, on June 25, 2014 shows the numbered Buk units as well as the number plate of one of the transporters being used, which matches vehicles visible in the convoy videos. Images posted to the now-deleted profile of brigade member Ivan Krasnoproshin also show vehicles that are part of the convoy.

Images posted to social media accounts of 53rd Brigade members show certificates issued by the unit detailing their promotion after a training exercise that took place between June 22nd and July 25th. These dates are significant as not only was the convoy seen heading towards the border on June 23rd, but, as Section 3 will detail, some vehicles returned to the base before July 19th.

Buk 3×2

The most important feature of this convoy is the presence of the same Buk missile launcher filmed on July 17th 2014 travelling through separatist territory and linked by some to the downing of MH17. The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team refers to this Buk as “Buk 3×2” as the middle number appears to have been worn off. It appears in 8 of the 16 videos showing the convoy travelling between June 23rd and June 25th, and the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has been able to match features of the missile launcher in the convoy to those seen on the missile launcher filmed and photographed in Ukraine on July 17th. It is the opinion of the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team that because of these matches the vehicle seen in the convoy and travelling through separatists controlled territory on July 17th is the same vehicle.

The Paris Match photograph taken in Donetsk on July 17th has proven to be very valuable in confirming the origin and identity of the Buk missile launcher. There are two key elements that match, the white markings on the side of the vehicle, and damage to the side skirt above the tracks of the Buk.

The markings on the side of Buk 3×2 consist of the following:

• Unit designation, typically 3 digits
• Transportation-related markings, in this case a circle with a cross in the centre and the marking “H=2200”
• A white mark visible on the side skirt
• Another white mark on the opposite side of the vehicle.

As with other Russian vehicles appearing inside Ukraine under separatist control, attempts have been made to obscure the unit designation number. However, it is still possible to match the markings because these markings are not applied to Buk missile launchers in a consistent fashion. Because of this, each Buk has slightly different positions for the unit designation numbers and do not share the same additional markings, such as the transportation-related markings. When they do share additional markings, they are generally not in the exact same position. In addition to this, on “Buk 3×2” (with the middle number obscured) we have an additional white mark on the side skirt that appears to serve no purpose, and may be nothing more than an accidental splash of paint. It is also notable that some of these markings can be recognized in the photograph taken in Snizhne.

In the case of the Paris Match photograph, the top of the faded number is visible, although much of the unit designation number and the top of the “2” have been obscured. By skewing the Paris Match image, it is possible to flatten the image, which has allowed us to lay the Paris Match photograph over images of Buk 3×2 in the Russian convoy:

It’s clear from these images that the positions of the markings match. In addition, the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has attempted the same type of comparison with other Buk missile launchers from both Ukraine and Russia. No other comparison made by the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has come close to matching all the matching elements between the images of Buk 3×2 in Russia and the Paris Match Buk.

Fingerprints

In addition to comparing the markings on the vehicles, the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team was also able to establish a second feature on Buk missile launchers that varies between units: side skirt damage. The side skirt that runs above the tracks of the Buk systems is prone to damage, and this creates a unique pattern of damage we refer to as the “side skirt fingerprint.” Below, a Buk that is certainly the same in each photograph shows a high correlation in each side skirt profile.

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team compared the side skirt fingerprints of a number of Buk missile systems in Ukraine and Russia in order to find possible matches to the Buk seen in the Paris Match photograph. In each of the following side skirt fingerprint images, the red line is for the Paris Match Buk.

Of these Buks, the side skirt profile with the highest correlation is Buk 3×2 filmed transported near Stary Oskol in June. Many of the other photographs are clearly not matches for the Paris Match Buk, including Buk 312 filmed in Ukraine. Below, another comparison of the side skirt profiles between the two photos shows a similarity that can be seen in both the isolated amplitudes and in the photographs:

However, there is one discrepancy: on the right hand side of the comparison, there is a small but significant difference underneath the transportation-related markings, but this in fact further confirms that these two Buks are one in the same. Because the Paris Match photograph has been flattened, any damage to the side skirt that projects outwards would cause a distortion that would not be visible in any images taken directly side-on to the vehicle, such as the images used to compare the side skirt fingerprints. This means that if there is a difference, that type of damage to the side skirt would have to be visible to account for the difference, and if that damage was visible then it would be further confirmation that it was the same vehicle.

This damage is in fact visible in two videos of Buk 3×2 filmed in Russia, one in Stary Oskol (2:02) showing the damage from behind, and another from Alexeyevka (0:50) showing the same damage from the opposite direction. The damage is in the same position as the discrepancy in the Buk fingerprint from the Paris Match photograph, and further confirms the Buk in the Paris Match photograph is the same vehicle travelling through Russia as part of the 53rd Brigade’s convoy towards the Ukrainian border in late June 2014.

Conclusion

In the opinion of the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team, the Buk missile launcher filmed and photographed travelling through separatist-held territory on July 17th is the same vehicle seen in the convoy travelling through Russia towards to the Ukrainian border in late June 2014.

Section Three: The July Convoy

Following the downing of MH17, videos were uploaded to various websites showing a military convoy travelling through Russia. The convoy consisted of a number of transport vehicles carrying covered units, as well as two uncovered Buk systems. The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team has been able to establish the route the convoy took and that the convoy originated from the 53rdAnti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. In the July convoy, at least one vehicle in the July convoy was also in the June convoy. Additionally, at least one Buk missile loader seen in the June convoy was recorded on July 20th near separatist-controlled areas of the border, hundreds of kilometres away from the location it was recorded in as part of the June convoy.

The Convoy

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team was able to identity 10 videos posted on July 19th and 20th, 2014 showing a military convoy consisting of multiple vehicles, including covered vehicles on transporters. It was possible to link vehicles in this convoy to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade with the following image taken from the Fedeseyevka video on July 20th. This video shows a BT80 with the number 993.

The same vehicle appears in the photos on the VKontakte page of Sanya Reznikov, who, according to his profile, served in the 53rd Brigade from 2013 to sometime in 2014.

Other members of this Brigade also posted photographs of the same vehicle with identical markings.

Although many of the vehicles in the July convoy appear to have different number plates than those in the June convoy (when discernable), at least one vehicle seen in the June convoy was also part of the July convoy.

Based on the videos collected by the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team, it has also been possible to track the movements of the convoy seen on July 19th and 20th. Footage filmed in Fedoseyevka on July 19th appears to place the convoy at its earliest point in the route, travelling through the town of Stary Oskol, then toAlexeevka southeast of Stary Oskol, and the last sighting further southeast in the town of Olkhovatka on July 20th.

One video from July 20th was of particular interest to the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team. This video was posted online from the town of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, over 300km from the location of the other videos posted on July 20th This video shows a Buk missile loader being transported through the town. This same vehicle was seen as part of the June convoy heading to the Ukrainian border in June.

The Bellingcat MH17 investigation team was able to establish the precise location the video was filmed, establishing that the vehicle was on the M21 motorway that runs eastwards from the Ukrainian border approximately 20km away. The vehicle was heading south, possibly towards the Russian border town of Donetsk (not to be confused with Donetsk in Ukraine). Donetsk has previously been identified as a crossing point for units from Russia into separatist-controlled territories in Ukraine.

Two differences from the June recordings of the Buk are noticeable. First, the missiles are in different positions, and second, the missiles are covered in camouflage netting. While certainly not in any way conclusive, the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team notes that during their investigation, they have only seen netting used on one other vehicle: the Buk filmed inside Ukraine on July 17th.

Conclusion

Based on the above information the Bellingcat MH17 investigation team concludes that at some point in late June vehicles that were part of the June 23rd convoy from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade separated. Some of these vehicles returned to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade base in Kursk and joined the July 19th convoy from the base, while at least one other, a Buk missile loader, appears to have left the main convoy and towards the Ukrainian border, close to a separatist-held crossing. As yet, it has not been possible to establish when the June 23rd convoy returned to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade base in Kursk, or how many units were in the convoy. However, it is clear that at least one Buk missile launcher (3×2) from the June 23rd convoy was inside separatist-controlled territory on July 17th, and 3 days later a video was uploaded showing that the Buk system loader unit was very close to the Ukrainian border. Considering the established time frames, logical routes, and photographic evidence, it is possible that this Buk missile launcher was part of the same June 23rd convoy as “Buk 3×2” and supported it. However, it has not been possible to establish that relationship between the two vehicles.

Acknowledgements

The Bellingcat MH17 Investigation Team

Timmi Allen
Andrew Haggard
Eliot Higgins
Veli-Pekka Kivimaki
Iggy Ostanin
Aric Toler

This report was created collaboratively using Slack.com.

Thanks to Mapbox for their help creating the maps used in this investigation.

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Pakistan successfully tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile today with an impact point in the Persian Gulf. The newly tested version of the Shaheen-II ballistic missile, which is roughly equivalent to the US's Pershing II missiles, can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads according to ISPR, the Pakistani army's public relations arm.

The announcement seems to confirm expert analysis that the country is aiming to build long-range delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons — smaller warheads built for use in a battlefield or active combat scenario, rather than for strikes on cities or infrastructure.

Addressing scientists, engineers, and military officers viewing the test site, lieutenant general Zubair Mahmood Hayat still reiterated Pakistan's stance that the goal of its strides in ballistic capability is deterrence — presumably against any rash military action by India, with which Pakistan has a number of outstanding territorial and security-related disputes.

Pakistani news media put the range of the Shaheen-II at 1,500 kilometers, though the Federation of American Scientists estimates it may be able to travel 2,000 kilometers or more depending on its payload. One Indian television news program included a map showing the several India's cities that fall within the missile's now-proven range.

The test is the latest development in a long-running arms race between Pakistan and its neighbor.

In 1999 Pakistan tested a shorter-ranged Shaheen missile that was also capable of carrying nuclear weapons. After that test, Pakistan's officials cited a concern for preserving "strategic balance in south Asia"— an objective that has India, Pakistan's larger, more populous, more powerful, and also nuclear-armed rival, squarely in mind.

The missile program has established that strategic balance with India, Arif Rafiq, a researcher at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider in September.

"Since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there has been a greater level of restraint in terms of the behavior of both countries when it comes to war," Rafiq said. "But at the same time they also taken great measures to build up their nuclear arsenal and further develop or strengthen or diversify their launch capability."

While nuclear development continues, India and Pakistan have become the world's first and third largest arms importers, respectively.

SEE ALSO: China is finally acting like a superpower — and nobody knows what's going to happen next.

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Russia will conduct the final test of a new intercontinental ballistic missile in December, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, also known as TASS, reported Thursday, citing a source in the country’s defense industry.

According to the report, the last test of the solid propellant inter-continental ballistic missile, RS-26, also called “Avangard and Rubezh,” has been scheduled for sometime in December.

The new ballistic missile was created on the basis of the RS-24 Yars missile, which can reportedly carry up to 10 independently targetable warheads and was first tested in May 2007. At the time, the test was publicized as a response to a missile shield that the U.S. was planning to deploy in Europe.

“The testing is not over yet. According to the current plans the new missile is to enter duty in 2015. In December, there will be the final launch to be followed by a decision in favor of serial manufacturing,” the source told TASS.

The new RS-26 missile, which is said to be equipped with improved combat capabilities and multiple warheads, will be lighter than the RS-24 Yars and launched from a mobile surface vehicle, Colonel Sergey Karakayev, commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Force, said, according to TASS.

Russia is also said to be considering reviving Soviet-era nuclear missile trains as part of an effort to revamp the country’s nuclear arsenal. An anonymous source told TASS that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which produces the Topol, Yars and Bulava missiles, is developing a next-generation missile launching train.

“While the decision to start manufacturing [missile trains] is still pending, the probability is high that it will happen… In the best-case scenario, they will be deployed by the end of the decade, probably somewhere around 2019,” the source told TASS, adding that technical studies and cost estimates are yet to be made.

Reports also said Thursday that Russia would test-fire a Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile from the Alexander Nevsky, a nuclear-powered submarine, on Sunday, in the Barents Sea on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Russian Far East.

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Ashton Carter, President Barack Obama's nominee to succeed Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense, is largely known as a behind-the-scenes player, a thinker and manager rather than a public agitator. This low profile is arguably one of Carter's top selling points.

After Hagel's troubled reign at the Pentagon, which ended in a highly public falling out with the White House over policy in the Middle East and accusations of laziness and dysfunction, it's prudent for the president to want a respected yet comparatively obscure figure like Carter to take over.

But that doesn't mean that Carter is totally surprise-free. As Time's Mark Thompson pointed out in April of 2013, Carter and a co-author argued for bombing North Korea in the summer of 2006 to prevent an upcoming ballistic missile test.

"'Surgical strike'" is a much-abused term," Carter and former Clinton official William J. Perry argued. "But destroying a test missile as it is being readied for launch qualifies for this category because only one US cruise missile or precision bomb with an ordinary high-explosive warhead could easily puncture and ignite the multistory test booster."

The target would be the Taepodong 2 missile, which had the potential (albeit long-term) to deliver a nuclear warhead to US holdings in the Pacific, including Hawaii. Luckily, the multi-stage missile tumbled to earth within a minute of a test pointedly carried out on July 4th, 2006.

But in the Time piece, Carter and Perry emphasized that North Korea could extract valuable information even from a failed test. And the US had the military means of preventing North Korea from even attempting to develop weapons capable of hitting American territory without incurring a substantial loss of life in the process: "As with space-shuttle launches from Cape Canaveral, all personnel would normally be a safe distance away from the rocket at the time, so there should be no collateral damage," they reassure their readers.

There are two assumptions underlying this line of analysis. One is that a belligerent and unpredictable North Korea would use long-range missiles as strategic leverage over the US and its allies in the event of a violent crisis in the Korean Peninsula. If pushed far enough, North Korea could attack Guam or Hawaii in attempt to demoralize the US or, conversely, bait it deeper into conflict.

The other assumption is that North Korea wouldn't attack the South if it were subject to the kind of US strike that Carter and Perry envisioned. Given the very limited scope of the attack they recommend, along with Pyongyang's perennial concerns over regime stability and probable desire not to trigger a regional war while on the brink of a nuclear weapons capability, this seems like a sound assumption.

So would an attack actually have been advisable?

A single US strike might have frozen North Korean missile development while proving the US was capable of backing its security interests in the region with force — something that could even have convinced North Korea to back down from the nuclear threshold.

Pyongyang would hold three nuclear tests after its Taepodong 2 adventure including its first-ever test in October of 2006. The commander of US forces in South Korea recently said he believed Iran was aiding North Korea's nuclear program, raising the possibility that the Tehran regime has access to vital information from these tests; meanwhile, external trade with North Korea has actually dramatically increased in the years since the first nuclear test was held, perhaps proving that the reality of a nuclear deterrent has forced the world to accept the regime's long-term survival. Carter and Perry's proposed attack might have changed the trajectory of the Korean Peninsula, or even prevented the troubling present-day state of play.

Conversely, it might have eroded elite confidence in the Kim regime, leading to internal unrest in North Korea or otherwise triggering a cascade of uncontrollable or unpredictable events.

A nearly decade-old article written when Carter was out of government and teaching at Harvard University probably doesn't offer much insight into how he would lead the Pentagon.

But the Time article still shows the probable future secretary of defense grappling with an issue that just about no one's been able to solve, a national security puzzle that's flummoxed nearly two decades' worth of Democratic and Republican presidents.

The solution he reached was signifcantly different than what most policymakers were recommending at hte time — and might have been the right move anyway.

SEE ALSO: North Korea is in the process of developing a fleet of nuclear-capable submarines

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The Rafael Python-4 is a 4th generation air-to-air missile built by the Israeli weapons manufacturer Rafael Advanced Defense System.

With an all-aspect attack ability and integration with helmet-mounted sight systems of the Israeli Elbit Dash (Display and Sight Helmet), the Python-4 uses a dual band (IR and UV) seeker and is equipped with Infra-Red Electronic Counter-Counter Measure to reduce the effect of flares released by the target.

The AAM has a warhead of 11 kg, with an active laser proximity fuse (and back-up impact fuse) a range of 15 km and can accelerate to a speed of Mach +3.5.

The FAB (Força Aérea Brasileira) is equipped with about 200 such missiles. The above image is a screenshot, taken from an onboard camera, of Python-4 missile fired on a firing range by a Brazilian F-5EM Tiger II.

Used in the air-superiority role, the Tigers will be gradually withdrawn between 2017 and 2030, and replaced by the SAAB Gripen NG.

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It’s called “the vicious circle of space acquisition."

Large satellite systems take a long time to develop. As the years stretch on, the temptation to change requirements and add new capabilities is too hard to resist.

And once the spacecraft is launched it’s impossible to swap out the hardware.

Schedules slip. Production lines go cold, increasing the contractors’ costs.

By the time the satellite is sent to orbit, the technology aboard is already generations behind what is available in the commercial marketplace.

This was all described in a 2012 paper co-authored by Lt. Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, then Air Force Space and Missile Center commander.

"Since the mid-1990s, we have seen some of the longest delivery times for major space systems since the beginning of the space age,” she wrote in “Space: Disruptive Challenges, New Opportunities, and New Strategies” published in Strategic Studies Quarterly.

However, deliveries of new space systems of late have all but come to a halt.

The communication satellites being launched now are based on designs dating back to the early 2000s.

The last major contract award was in 2008 for the third-generation GPS satellites.

That was also the year the Defense Department canceled the Transformational Satellite Communication System, or T-Sat, a six-year effort to create a next-generation spacecraft that came to naught.

Six years later, there are no new Air Force satellites on the horizon.

The Air Force is in the throes of conducting several studies that service officials say may lead to a radically new space architecture. Meanwhile, as the paper noted, getting space system acquisition right is more important than ever.

The nature of how it is employed by the military has changed over the past dozen years.

The Cold War era was marked by strategic applications such as nuclear command and control, and remote sensing satellites searching for rocket launches and large-scale troop movements.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq brought space down to the troop level with GPS, tactical communications and command and control of drones bringing immediate benefits to those who were fighting insurgents.

"Without exaggeration, the combat effects we have come to expect from our smaller, more mobile force structure would not be possible without space capabilities,” wrote Pawlikowski, who has since moved on to become the military deputy at the office of  the assistant secretary for Air Force acquisition.

The buzzword in policy circles has been “disaggregation."

Instead of large satellites and small constellations, the Air Force could deploy smaller spacecraft in larger numbers. It could also save funding by piggybacking payloads on other commercial or government satellites, a concept known as “hosted payloads.

Placing an instrument on a large satellite that has extra space can reduce deployment time from seven to eight years to two to three years, she wrote.

"Disaggregation will allow us to realize more affordable and resilient capabilities for the theater war fighter while at the same time allowing smaller, nuclear hardened cores to be retained,” the paper said.

In the aftermath of a 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapons test and incidents where GPS signals have been jammed, “resiliency” has been part of the equation along with affordability. Space systems have increasingly been seen as vulnerable.

Paul Hamill, director of strategy communications at the American Security Project think tank, said, “We have a system right now where we have big, one-off, specialized satellites that need huge rockets and engines to get them up there … We need to move away from that model.

He agreed with the notion of making space more “responsive,” with the deployment of smaller satellites that can be launched more rapidly.

"Let’s get smaller stuff up that can do bits of everything because let’s face it, if we have a state actor or non-state actor shoot one of these down, it’s not easily replaceable. If you shoot three down, we’re in serious trouble."

Pawlikowski said the Air Force should adopt a “payload-focused” strategy where requirements for communications, sensors or other capabilities are more frequently produced and sent to orbit on smaller satellites. That will keep manufacturers’ production lines hot, stabilize requirements, reduce the economic consequences of losing vehicles and deny adversaries the opportunity to do widespread damage by destroying one spacecraft, she wrote.

If that is accomplished, “We can see a path to unwinding the vicious circle facing today’s space acquisition,” she added.

Todd Harrison, senior fellow of defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, was skeptical that the Air Force had put its space acquisition woes behind it.

"To go in a new direction, you have to start a new program of some kind, whether it is more of an existing system, leveraging current research or hosted payloads … and in this budget environment, that is incredibly difficult,” he said.

If the Air Force were to start a new, clean-slate design of a large communications satellite, it would likely repeat the mistakes of the past such as T-Sat, he said.

"I don't think we have fixed the root causes. The primary problem with T-Sat was the temptation to place every possible feature on one satellite,” he said.

We were trying to build the next big thing for protected communications and place all the requirements for wideband onto it. It proved to be too technically far reaching and expensive.

He noted that after six years of work on T-Sat, the expected launch date had slipped by six years.

"We were no closer to launching it when the program was canceled than when we began,” Harrison said. “That’s the problem of building these big, “Battlestar Galactica-type satellites."

As the Air Force continues in a state of limbo when it comes to new start programs, Harrison sees a lack of interest on the part of Pentagon leaders. The series of studies the Air Force is conducting on new space architectures is just a way to buy time, he added.

"While everyone recognizes space as a critical enabler for the war fighter at all levels of conflict, from low to high end, it is not the sexy weapon system that puts hot metal on a target. So it doesn’t attract much interest from senior leaders,” he said.

The pause in acquisition programs could probably continue for three to five years, but after that, if the Air Force doesn’t kick off some kind of new program, it could begin to see capability gaps, Harrison predicted.

Said Hamill: The acquisition pause will continue “for as long as Congress is willing to let it go on."

Hamill has seen renewed interest in space topics on Capitol Hill in the wake of the RD-180 rocket engine controversy. The Russian-supplied engines are critical for launching large satellites. Talk of cutting the United States off from acquiring the engines as tensions with Russia grew in 2014 prompted lawmakers to take a new look at the program.

Current National Defense Authorization Act language demands that the Air Force begins an effort to build its own heavy lift engines.

Incoming House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, and ranking member, Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., will push for acquisition reform, and space will be a part of that, Hamill noted.

"I think the issue of us funding Russia has livened this issue up in Congress especially with … Mac and Adam. It has reawakened some interest in this,” Hamill said.

And presumptive Secretary of Defense “Ash Carter knows this issue back to front. It also helps that he a physicist,” he added. “I believe that he is going to take this issue on.

Launch is important because the idea of disaggregated space architecture, which is more responsive to requirements, demands less expensive and dependable access to space.

Pawlikowski wrote that increased frequency of the launches will result in economies of scale and bring down prices.

Hamill said the private sector is ready and willing to step in and provide lower cost launches, and even build an RD-180 replacement if necessary, at no cost to US taxpayers.

"The military side of space issues and launch capabilities are stuck in the early 1990s. We’ve actually got private companies out there who can do this. Industry and the private sector have moved on. It’s the public sector who haven’t,” Hamill said.

On the terrestrial side, the Air Force recently embarked on a study to determine whether commercial satellite communications providers can take over the day-to-day command and control of military satellites using their networks of ground stations.

Four commercial satellite providers received contracts in October to study the idea.

A statement from one of the companies, Intelsat, noted that it alone had some 400 antennas scattered throughout the world with 99.9 percent availability. It costs a com-sat provider one-fifth of what it costs the Air Force to operate the same system, it said.

Harrison said the idea is certainly worth looking into, especially since systems such as the Air Force’s Wideband Global Satcom technology are based on commercial communications satellites.

As for military protected communications, which have unique command-and-control requirements, probably not, he said.

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China carried out a long-range missile flight test on Saturday using multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, according to US defense officials.

The flight test Saturday of a new DF-41 missile, China’s longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile, marks the first test of multiple warhead capabilities for China, officials told the Washington Free Beacon.

China has been known to be developing multiple-warhead technology, which it obtained from the United States illegally in the 1990s.

However, the Dec. 13 DF-41 flight test, using an unknown number of inert maneuvering warheads, is being viewed by US intelligence agencies as a significant advance for China’s strategic nuclear forces and part of a build-up that is likely to affect the strategic balance of forces.

China’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to include around 240 very large warheads. That number is expected to increase sharply as the Chinese deploy new multiple-warhead missiles.

The current deployed US strategic warhead arsenal includes 1,642 warheads. All 450 Minuteman III missiles have been modified to no longer carry MIRVs. However, Trident II submarine-launched missiles can carry up to 14 MIRVs per missile.

Additionally, the development of China’s multiple warhead technology was assisted by illegal transfers of technology from US companies during the Clinton administration, according to documents and officials familiar with the issue.

Details of the flight test and the number of dummy warheads used during it could not be learned.

However, the DF-41 has been assessed by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), the intelligence community’s primary missile spy center, as capable of carrying up to 10 warheads.

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Jeff Pool declined to comment on the DF-41 test. “We encourage greater PRC transparency regarding their defense investments and objectives to avoid miscalculation,” Pool said in response to questions about the Chinese missile launch.

China’s government has made no mention of the test, which was carried out at an unknown missile test facility. Past tests of the DF-41 have been carried out at the Wuzhai Missile and Space Testing facility, located about 250 miles southwest of Beijing.

A report made public earlier this month by a congressional China commission stated that the DF-41 will be able to carry up to 10 warheads and is expected to be deployed next year.

“The DF-41, which could be deployed as early as 2015, may carry up to 10 MIRVs, and have a maximum range as far as 7,456 miles, allowing it to target the entire continental United States,” the report said. “In addition, some sources claim China has modified the DF–5 and the DF–31A to be able to carry MIRVs.”

China also conducted a flight test in late September of another long-range missile, called the DF-31B that also could be outfitted to carry MIRVs.

“China could use MIRVs to deliver nuclear warheads on major US cities and military facilities as a means of overwhelming U.S. ballistic missile defenses,” the report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said.

NASIC intelligence analyst Lee Fuell told the commission that China’s mobile MIRV-modified missiles provide greater targeting with fewer missiles and allow for a larger reserve of missiles during a conflict.

“China is likely to employ a blend of these three as MIRVs become available, simultaneously increasing their ability to engage desired targets while holding a greater number of weapons in reserve,” Fuell was quoted as saying in the report.

A classified NASIC report dated Dec. 10, 1996 stated that China developed a “smart dispenser” for launching multiple satellites using technology developed under a contract with Motorola to launch Iridium communications satellites. The technology transfer was approved by the administration of President Bill Clinton.

“An initial NAIC study determined that a minimally-modified [smart dispenser] stage could be used on a ballistic missile as a multiple-reentry vehicle post-boost vehicle” that could be used for multiple warheads “with relatively minor changes.”

In 2000, the State Department fined Lockheed Martin Corp. $13 million for improperly exporting weapons data on the rocket technology used in multiple-warhead missiles

The US data was provided to China’s state-run Great Wall Industries, a missile manufacturer, through a Hong Kong company called Asiasat and used in systems called expendable perigee kick motors—a key element used in MIRV guidance.

The kick motors are used to position a multiple warhead “bus” or stage as part of the targeting process.

The transfers were made under loosened export controls by the Clinton administration beginning in 1993.

Larry Wortzel, a former military intelligence official who specialized on China, said the Chinese military has been working on a MIRV-modified DF-41 for a number of years.

Wortzel said Chinese military research literature has documented work on the DF-41 but the Pentagon “has been reluctant to discuss or confirm these developments.”

“The United States is now threatened with a more deadly and survivable nuclear force that makes our weak ballistic missile defenses less effective,” Wortzel said. “We need to improve our own defenses and modernize our own deterrent force as the Chinese are doing.”

Rick Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military, said the advent of China’s MIRV capability should mark the end of US efforts to reduce the number of nuclear warheads.

“The Chinese have not and likely will not disclose their nuclear warhead buildup plans, Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces across the board and violating the INF treaty with new classes of missiles, so it would be suicidal for the Washington to pursue a new round of nuclear reductions as is this administration’s preference.”

Fisher, with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said China may deploy a combination of single-warhead and multiple warhead DF-41s, with the single warhead version carrying a huge “city buster” multi-megaton bombs.

“The beginning of China’s move toward multiple warhead-armed nuclear missiles is proof that today, arms control is failing to increase the security of Americans,” Fisher said. “Instead, it is time to be rebuilding US nuclear warfighting capabilities, to include new mobile ICBMs, new medium range missiles and new tactical nuclear missile systems.”

Georgetown University Professor Phillip Karber has studied China’s nuclear forces and believes its arsenal is far larger than the US intelligence estimate of 240.

“The Chinese development of the DF-41 has been a long term, methodical process,” Karber said. “However, if as we suspect they are going to put a MIRVed version of the missile on both rail and road-mobile launchers, the number of reentry vehicles could grow quite rapidly depending on the number of warheads they end up putting on the missiles.”

The DF-41 was revealed inadvertently by the Chinese government last summer when details, including the fact that it will be a multi-warhead missile, appeared on a provincial government website before being quickly censored and removed.

The Shaanxi provincial government announced June 13 in a progress report on its Environmental Monitoring Center Station that the DF-41 missile was among its projects.

“On-site monitoring for Phase Two of the project’s final environmental assessment and approval of support conditions for the development of the DF-41 strategic missile by the 43rd Institute of the 4th Academy of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) was initiated,” the notice said. AVIC is China’s state-owned aerospace and defense conglomerate.

A state-run Global Times report, also later censored and taken offline, quoted a Chinese expert as saying the missile will carry multiple warheads.

The flight test Saturday was the third such test for the new DF-41. The Free Beacon first reported the second flight test of the missile in December 2013. The first flight test was carried out July 24, 2012

After several years of silence on the DF-41, the Pentagon disclosed the existence of the new missile in its latest annual report on the Chinese military, made public in June.

“China also is developing a new road-mobile ICBM known as the Dong Feng-41 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV),” the report says.

SEE ALSO: Newly released NSA documents show that China captured American soldiers during the Vietnam War

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